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Missed Opportunity: Stephenson v. Dow




Class actions represent a unique' and unsettled area2 in the
American legal system. A class action is a suit brought by an individual
or a group in which the individual or group serves as a representative of
similar claims for the entire class.3 The debate on the efficiency and
efficacy of class actions has not been misguided because class action
claims encompass a broad range of societal issues from claims for
securities fraud4 to mass torts, such as asbestos,5 tobacco,a and Agent
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2005; B.A., magna cum laude, Gettysburg College, 1999. The author would
like to thank his family for their continued support and encouragement.
1. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1940) (recognizing that the general rule
provides that an individual is not bound to a judgment if not a party in the action, but an
exception exists that the "judgment in a 'class' or 'representative' suit, to which some
members of the class are parties, may bind members of the class or those represented who
were not made parties to it").
2. The problems with class actions have been a source of significant commentary in
the academic community. See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and
Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 914 n.2 (1998) (stating that a full listing of all the
contributions to the discussion of class action litigation would require "a sizeable
appendix"). Recent decisions are likely to ensure the continuation of this trend. See infra
Part III for a discussion of two of these decisions, Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591 (1997) and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
3. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a). The four prerequisites necessary for class representation
are:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.
Id.
4. See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2001).
5. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Ortiz v.
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Orange.7
Class action proceedings perform important functions for both the
parties in the action and the court system. First, class actions improve
the accessibility to the judicial system for individuals unable to afford the
cost of representation and litigation.8 Second, class actions improve
judicial efficiency by consolidating claims to prevent the court system
from being burdened with a separate, individual claim for each member
of the class. 9 The preservation of these functions is essential to the future
availability of class actions, and these functions should remain an
influential factor in any judicial decision that could potentially alter class
action litigation.'
0
Mass tort claims" have been instrumental in shaping class action
litigation due to the frequency of these claims and the burden they place
on the court system. 12 The courts have responded to mass tort claims,
primarily through class action and bankruptcy proceedings, due to
Congress' failure to properly respond through legislation.' 3 Class action
settlements in mass tort claims have developed into an effective
mechanism for both plaintiffs and defendants to avoid the time, cost, and
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
6. See, e.g., Floyd v. Thompson, 227 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 2000) (providing a
summary of the Master Settlement Agreement between tobacco companies and all but
four states).
7. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y.
1984).
8. Developments in the Law-The Paths of Civil Litigation: IV. Class Action
Reform: An Assessment of Recent Judicial Decisions & Legislative Initiatives, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 1806, 1806 (2000) (stating that a class action "provides individuals with injuries
insufficient to justify the cost of a lawsuit an economically feasible avenue of redress").
9. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 598 (describing the burden of asbestos litigation on the
court system by citing the size of dockets, length of trials, litigating the same matters
repeatedly, and high transaction costs).
10. Developments in the Law-The Paths of Civil Litigation: IV. Class Action
Reform: An Assessment of Recent Judicial Decisions & Legislative Initiatives, supra note
8, at 1827 (concluding that recent legislative and judicial reforms to class actions are a
welcome effort, but warning that the lack of a coordinated effort among the reforms
could undermine the viability of the class action as a means of relief for individuals).
11. Greg M. Zipes, After Amchem and Ahearn: The Rise of Bankruptcy Over the
Class Action Option for Resolving Mass Torts on a Nationwide Basis, and the Fall of
Finality?, 1998 DET. C. L. REV. 7, 14 (1998) (defining mass torts as either a single
catastrophic mass tort, such as a plane crash, or a latent tort, such as exposure to a
chemical resulting in an illness years later).
12. See Deborah Hensler & Mark Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury
Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 961 (1993) (providing a
discussion on the burden that mass tort claims place on the court system and stating that
mass tort claims constituted one quarter of the civil caseload in some courts during the
1980s).
13. Zipes, supra note 11, at 8. See, e.g., Amchem, 521 U.S. at 628-29 (stating that
Congress has failed to adopt an administrative system for asbestos claims).
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uncertainty of a lengthy litigation.1
4
The availability of a settlement in class action litigation has evolved
into a specific claim, the settlement class action. A settlement class
action is defined as "a class action that is designed to be settled rather
than litigated, with the defendant not objecting to certification of the
class providing the settlement is approved."' 5 Settlement class actions
developed through judicial creation, and courts have extended Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 23 to govern settlement class actions
in addition to class action lawsuits. 16
Defendants have embraced the class action settlement, utilizing it as
a negotiation tool. Class action settlements provide defendants with the
opportunity to dispense with numerous claims, bind class members to the
settlement, and preclude additional claims.' 7 However, a recent decision
provides a new basis for absent class members to challenge the finality of
a class action settlement to which they are bound.'
8
In Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co.,19 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals was confronted with a new challenge to the finality of the global
Agent Orange class action settlement and ruled that the settlement did
not preclude the plaintiffs' claims. 20  The Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the Stephenson case, but the Court's four-to-four split
merely affirmed the decision from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.2'
In Stephenson, the Court missed an opportunity to provide guidance and
a degree of certainty to an unsettled area of class action litigation-the
ability of class members to challenge the adequacy of representation in a
14. Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class
Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 151 (2003) (stating that "class actions today serve as a
procedural vehicle not ultimately for adversarial litigation but for deal making on a mass
basis").
15. Roger C. Cramton, Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and "Settlement Class
Actions": An Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 811, 823 (1995); see John D. Aldock &
Richard M. Wyner, The Use of Settlement Class Actions to Resolve Mass Tort Claims
After Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 33 TORT & INS. L.J. 905, 905 (1998)
(explaining that procedurally the defendant agrees to certification of the class for
settlement, but remains free to challenge the certification if the settlement fails).
16. See Nikita Malhotra Pastor, Comment: Equity and Settlement Class Actions: Can
There be Justice for All in Ortiz v. Fibreboard?, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 773, 780-89, (2000)
(analyzing the development of the class action settlement from its historical roots in the
twelfth century through its modem use under FRCP 23).
17. See William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO.
L.J. 371, 372 (2001) (stating that "[t]he large, sprawling class action lawsuits.., have
more in common with business deals than they do with traditional adversarial litigation,
legislative activity, or executive management").
18. See Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 261.
21. Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (stating that Justice Stevens
did not participate in the decision).
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settlement through a collateral attack.
22
Part 1I of this comment discusses the historical background of Agent
Orange class action litigation to place the novelty of the Stephenson
decision within its historical context. Part III evaluates Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor23 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp. 24 the basis for
the Second Circuit's decision in Stephenson. Part IV analyzes the
Stephenson decision as an improper extension of the principles from
Amchem and Ortiz because the court disregarded the principle of finality
and retroactively applied new legal principles to a case that had already
closed. Part V compares the Stephenson decision with a conflicting
decision from the Ninth Circuit, Epstein v. MC.A. Inc.,25 and suggests
that the Epstein decision provides a better standard to balance the
adequacy of representation for absent class members with the finality of
class action settlements.
11. A History of Agent Orange Litigation
The courts that have contributed to the case law of Agent Orange
class action litigation have well-documented the complicated and lengthy
history of the litigation.26 A brief summary of the litigation, however, is
necessary to understand the context and implications of the Stephenson
decision.
In the 1970s, veterans of the Vietnam War began to manifest a
variety of illnesses that they attributed to their exposure to Agent
Orange, 27 a defoliant used during their military service. 28 The veterans
brought claims against the manufacturers of Agent Orange seeking
22. See Vermont v. Homeside Lending, Inc., 826 A.2d 997 (Vt. 2003) (providing a
summary of recent decisions on the adequacy of representation raised through collateral
attack and noting the disagreement among these decisions).
23. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
24. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
25. 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999).
26. See Hercules Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 420 (1996) (providing a brief
summary of Agent Orange litigation).
27. The veterans attributed a range of illnesses to Agent Orange, including cancer in
themselves and birth defects in their children. Charles Lane, Supreme Court Allows
Agent Orange Suit; Vietnam Veterans with Recently Diagnosed Ailments Can Sue
Despite 1985 Settlement, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 10, 2003, at A6. Medical studies
have failed to establish a conclusive causal link between Agent Orange and cancer. See
Peter Montague & Maria B. Pellerano, Victory for Viet Vets, THE NATION, Feb. 18, 2002,
at 24. A 1993 study by a branch of the National Academy of Sciences found a "positive
association" between herbicides and three types of cancers, soft-tissue sarcoma, non-
Hodgkin's lymphoma and Hodgkin's disease. Id. The study also found evidence
suggesting an association between herbicides and respiratory cancers, prostrate cancer
and multiple myeloma, a cancer of the bone marrow, Id.
28. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987, 988 (2d Cir. 1980).
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compensation for their illnesses.2 9
The Agent Orange litigation did not proceed to trial, however,
because the parties reached a global settlement.3 0  The settlement
included a 180 million dollar fund, established by the manufacturers of
Agent Orange, to compensate veterans injured by their exposure to
Agent Orange or surviving family members who had a parent or spouse
die from such exposure.3 ' The settlement also included procedures for
notifying additional class members, through various media sources, and a
provision permitting class members to opt out of the settlement to
preserve their right to an independent claim. 2 The District Court for the
Eastern District of New York certified the class and recognized the
settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate as required by FRCP 23."
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals approved the class
certification and settlement plan. 4
The Agent Orange settlement then withstood challenges brought in
1989 and 1990, known as the Ivy/Hartman litigation. 5 In these suits, the
plaintiffs argued that they were not bound by the settlement because their
injuries manifested after the establishment of the settlement fund in
29. Id.
30. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 748 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
For purposes of the settlement, the class was "defined as 'those persons who were in the
United States, New Zealand or Australian Armed Forces at any time from 1961 to 1972
who were injured while in or near Vietnam by exposure to Agent Orange or other
phenoxy herbicides"' and the class also included spouses, parents and children of the
veterans. Id. at 756.
31. Id. at 748.
32. Id. at 756. Plaintiffs who chose to opt out of the settlement and pursue
independent claims were unsuccessful. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d
187, 189 (2d Cir. 1987). In their ensuing independent action, the district court granted
the defendants' motion for summary judgment ruling that the government contractor
defense barred the manufacturers' liability for the veterans' exposure to Agent Orange.
Id. "The Government contractor defense.., shields contractors from tort liability for
products manufactured for the Government in accordance with government
specifications, if the contractor warned the United States about any hazards known to the
contractor but not the Government." Hercules Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 421-
22 (1996).
33. Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co., 618 F. Supp. 623, 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
34. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993). The
court of appeals recognized the weakness of the plaintiffs' claims and rejected challenges
to the class certification, notice scheme, and adequacy of representation based on the
availability of the government contractor defense to the defendants. In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 166 (2d Cir. 1987).
35. The Ivy/Hartman litigation consisted of two cases, Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock
Chemicals. Co. and Hartman v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals. Co., that were
consolidated and transferred to the Second Circuit. Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock
Chemicals. Co. (In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.), 996 F.2d 1425, 1430 (2d Cir.
1993).
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1984.36 Because class members were considered to be injured at the time
the exposure occurred, the Second Circuit found that the plaintiffs were
adequately represented in the Agent Orange global settlement. 37 The fact
that the plaintiffs manifested their injuries after the settlement was
established did not change their status as class members.38 The court
also noted that the settlement was structured to provide benefits to those
members who manifested injuries in the future. 39  Because the
Ivy/Hartman plaintiffs were represented in the settlement and entitled to
receive a benefit from the settlement fund, the court held that the
plaintiffs were bound by the settlement and their independent claims
were dismissed .
III. Recent Supreme Court Decisions on Settlement Class Actions
A review of the Supreme Court's recent decisions on settlement
class actions is necessary to understand the Second Circuit's decision in
Stephenson. While the Second Circuit did not apply the express holdings
from Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,
the Second Circuit relied on the principles and reasoning from these
decisions to reach its ruling in Stephenson.
A. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor
4 1
In Amchem, the Supreme Court addressed a settlement-only class
action suit that sought a global settlement of current and future asbestos
claims. 4' The district court certified the class despite objections that the
class counsel and class representatives had disqualifying conflicts of
interests.43 In addition, the class representatives included individuals
who suffered from actual physical injuries44 following asbestos exposure
and individuals who had been exposed to asbestos, but had not yet
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1433-34 (stating that "injury occurs when a deleterious substance enters a
person's body, even though its adverse effects are not immediately apparent").
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1436. The benefits of the fund included payments for death or disability of
class members even if death or injury occurred after the establishment of the settlement.
Id. at 1429. The fund also provided for grants to be made to agencies assisting veterans
with such things as counseling and filing forms. Id.
40. Id. at 1439.
41. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
42. Id. at 597.
43. Id. at 607 (stating that the district court rejected objections that common counsel
would not be able to represent individuals with varying degrees of injuries).
44. The plaintiffs' injuries ranged from lung cancer to asbestosis, a non-malignant




A challenge to the district court's certification, brought by members
of the class who opposed its broad composition, reached the Supreme
Court on direct appeal.46 Because the settlement had neither been
established nor had disbursement begun, the sole issue on appeal was the
class certification.47 The Court held that because the certification was for
settlement purposes, the settlement itself was relevant to the district
48court's certification process. The Court found that the district court's
certification of the "sprawling" class was improper because the class did
not "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 49
The Court found several deficiencies in the proposed Amchem
settlement and overruled the certification by the district court. First, the
Court noted that the attorneys who represented inventory plaintiffs,
individuals that currently suffered from an illness, attempted to represent
future plaintiffs, individuals who had not yet manifested an illness,
without an existing attorney-client relationship.5 ° Second, the Court
noted the attempt to settle the claims of inventory plaintiffs prior to those
of the future plaintiffs.5' Third, the Court noted the absence of any
subclasses, despite the conflicting interests of the assorted plaintiffs.52
These conflicts may arise due to differences in the severity of injuries
among class members, as well as conflicts between present and future
claimants.53
B. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.
54
In Ortiz, the Supreme Court was again confronted with a class
45. Id. at 603.
46. Id. at 605 (stating that objectors to the settlement immediately appealed the
district court's certification).
47. Id. at 608.
48. Id. at 619.
49. Id. at 625 (stating that the class as certified by the district court could not meet
the interests of the diverse individuals within the class).
50. Id. at 600.
51. Id. (finding that the counsel for the defendant companies agreed to settle pending
claims once it was likely that the class counsel would agree to bind potential plaintiffs).
52. Id. at 627 (finding that the parties "achieved a global compromise with no
structural assurance of fair and adequate representation for the diverse groups and
individuals affected"). The court stated that the most obvious conflict would be the goal
of inventory plaintiffs to secure "generous immediate payments" while the goal of
exposure-only plaintiffs would be "an ample, inflation-protected fund for the future". Id.
at 626.
53. Id. at 627 (stating that "[tihe disparity between the currently injured and
exposure-only plaintiffs, and the diversity within each category are not made insignificant
by the District Court's finding that petitioners' assets suffice to pay claims under the
settlement.").
54. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
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action settlement in asbestos litigation. 55 A group of plaintiffs sought
certification of a mandatory class.56 The class was composed of
individuals with a claim against Fibreboard Corporation, individuals who
held the right to a future claim, and family members of class members
exposed to Fibreboard asbestos.5 7 The district court and the court of
appeals certified the class finding that the class had a common interest in
the settlement, the representatives of the class adequately represented any
absent class members, and no conflicts of interest existed between the
class and its counsel.
5 8
Relying on its decision in Amchem, the Supreme Court found that
the class as certified was deficient. 59 The Court emphasized the need for
a class composed of members with different interests, such as one
composed of present and future claimants, to be divided into subclasses
to ensure adequate representation, and to avoid conflicts between the
various class members and class counsel.6 ° Specifically, the Court noted
the interest of future claimants to secure a settlement that would
adequately provide for their claims when they manifested an injury in the
future. 61 The Court also noted that conflicts of interest can exist as a
result of the activities conducted by the attorney representing a class.62
The Court held that a class composed of divergent interests that is not
divided into subclasses fails to provide adequate protection to all of the
members of the class.
63
C. Following Amchem and Ortiz
Considered together, Amchem and Ortiz have broad implications for
class action settlements. These decisions have begun to provide
guidance for courts in future class action litigation, but the Supreme
Court will have to refine its stance by adding additional restrictions to the
class certification process. 64 As a result of Amchem and Ortiz, courts
55. Id. at 822. Unlike Amchem, the settlement involved a limited fund that consisted
of the corporations' assets and the proceeds from its insurance policies. Id. at 828.
56. Id. at 825.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 828-29.
59. Id. at 856.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 856.
62. Id. at 815 (stating that [i]n this case, certainly, any assumption that plaintiffs'
counsel could be of a mind to do their simple best in bargaining for the benefit of the
settlement class is patently at odds with the fact that at least some of the same lawyers
representing plaintiffs and the class had also negotiated the separate settlement of 45,000
pending claims. ...
63. Id. at 864.
64. See Zipes, supra note 11, at 37-38 (stating that "the Supreme Court simply stated
in Amchem what it would not permit, and not what it would definitely permit"); see also
1304 [Vol. 109:4
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determining certification of a class for settlement must strictly scrutinize
the composition of the class and its representation to avoid conflicts.65
In Amchem, the Supreme Court dealt with conflicts of interest that
exist between class members.66 The Court's decision changes the
composition of future class actions. In future mass tort class actions, a
single class will be divided into smaller subclasses to ensure that similar
claims are negotiated and settled independently.67 It naturally follows
that each additional subclass will require independent representation and
that the costs of litigation or settlement will increase, as each of the
claims of the subclass must be negotiated independently.68 In Amchem,
the Court attempted to ensure fairness and adequate representation for all
class members, but undermined the functions of the class action, which
are accessibility and efficiency within the courts.
69
In Ortiz, the Supreme Court relied on its Amchem decision and
described a second basis to ensure fair and adequate representation. 70 As
a result of these two decisions, the Court has established principles to
guide parties in future settlement attempts to assure that the interests of
all class members are protected from conflicting interests within the class
and among class counsel. 7  Settlements will only succeed through
careful identification of conflicts of interests, followed by the necessary
division of the class into subclasses with independent representation.
72
John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in
Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 370, 394 (2000) (noting that the Amchem
decision failed to specify the degree of difference necessary between class members to
necessitate a subclass).
65. See Aldock & Wyner, supra note 15, at 913 (discussing the implications of
Amchem to future settlements).
66. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 603 (1997).
67. See Coffee, supra note 64, at 374.
68. See id.
69. See Developments in the Law-The Paths of Civil Litigation: IV. Class Action
Reform: An Assessment of Recent Judicial Decisions and Legislative Initiatives, 113
supra note 8, at 1815 (stating that "the Court's decision in Amchem not only has
undermined the efficiency goal of the class action, but also, instead of ensuring
meaningful access to the courts, has created new hurdles for injured plaintiffs").
70. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999).
71. Coffee, supra note 64, at 394 (stating that Ortiz clarified Amchem by establishing
that class conflicts can only be eliminated if subclasses have independent representation).
72. But see id. at 438 (arguing that the Court should emphasize "voice" and "exit"
rather than strict adherence to adequate representation in order to avoid the
"Balkanization of the class action").
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IV. The Stephenson Decision as an Extension of Amchem and Ortiz
A. Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co. 73
The Stephenson case presented a new challenge to the previously
settled Agent Orange class action settlement. The plaintiffs in
Stephenson, Daniel Stephenson and Joe Isaacson, alleged that exposure
to Agent Orange during their military service caused their current
illnesses.74 The plaintiffs filed separate lawsuits against various Agent
Orange manufacturers, but the suits were eventually consolidated and
transferred to the District Court for the Eastern District of New York, the
court that certified the 1984 Agent Orange settlement. 75 The significant
factual distinction in the Stephenson litigation was that unlike the
Ivy/Hartman plaintiffs, the Stephenson plaintiffs manifested their injuries
after the settlement had expired and the benefits had been disbursed.76
Consistent with the precedent on Agent Orange, the district court granted
the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that the class certified for the
1984 settlement adequately represented the plaintiffs and, therefore,
barred them from bringing the current claims.77
On appeal, the Stephenson plaintiffs argued that the district court
erred in granting the defendants' motion to dismiss because they were
inadequately represented in the 1984 settlement. 78 The plaintiffs relied
on both the Amchem 79 and Ortiz80 cases to argue that they were not
parties bound by the 1984 settlement; therefore, their claims were not
barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 8 1 The Second Circuit agreed with
the plaintiffs and found that they were not adequately represented by the
class based on the timing of their illnesses. 82 The court distinguished its
73. 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001).
74. Id. at 256. Daniel Stephenson served in Vietnam for five years both on the
ground and as a helicopter pilot. Id. at 255. In 1998, he was diagnosed with multiple
myeloma, a bone marrow cancer, for which he underwent a bone marrow transplant. Id.
Joe Isaacson served in Vietnam for two years at an airplane base that sprayed herbicides,
including Agent Orange. Id. He was diagnosed with non-Hodgkins lymphoma in 1996.
Id.
75. Id. at 251.
76. Id. at 258.
77. Id. at 256.
78. Id. at 259.
79. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
80. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
81. Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 259. The doctrine of res judicata is applicable to an
earlier decision if the earlier decision meets four elements: "(1) a final judgment on the
merits, (2) by a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) in a case involving the same parties or
their privies, and (4) involving the same cause of action." Id. (quoting In re Teltronics
Servs., Inc. 762 F.2d 185, 190 (2d Cir. 1985)).
82. Id. at 260 (stating that a conflict arises because the settlement purported to settle
1306 [Vol. 109:4
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prior decision and reasoning in the Ivy/Hartman case and held that the
prior Agent Orange settlement did not preclude the plaintiffs from
asserting an independent claim.
83
The Stephenson decision and the Second Circuit's extension of
Amchem and Ortiz, therefore, raised numerous questions on the finality
of settlements.84 The decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, but
the outcome failed to provide any guidance on the validity of the Second
Circuit's analysis in Stephenson.85  The Supreme Court's four-to-four
split merely affirmed the court of appeals' decision. 6  The Supreme
Court did not provide any insight into its decision; consequently, the
issues and questions raised by the Stephenson decision remain
unresolved.87
B. The Finality of Settlements
The Stephenson decision and the Supreme Court's affirming split
not only emphasized the importance of the Amchem and Ortiz reasoning,
but also extended this reasoning to cast doubt on the finality of
established settlements. The Stephenson case differed significantly from
both Amchem and Ortiz. In Stephenson, the settlement fund was
established and had expired by the time the plaintiffs challenged the
adequacy of their representation in the global settlement. 88  The
all future claims, but did not provide a recovery for individuals who manifested an injury
after expiration of the fund). The Second Circuit in Stephenson failed to recognize that a
challenge to the adequacy of the settlement with respect to individuals who manifested an
injury after the expiration of the settlement had been raised during its previous decision.
Philip E. Karmel & Peter R. Paden, Toxic Torts; Agent Orange Case and Finality of
Judgments in Class Actions, NEW YORK L.J., Sept. 10, 2003, at 3.
On appeal, objecting class members argued that the class action has been
improperly certified because "[t]he 'injured' class representatives failed to
protect the substantive rights of all of those 'not yet manifested injury' class
members who will manifest injury after the year 1995 when the settlement fund
is project to be depleted."
Id. (quoting from Reply Brief for Appellants at 16, In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab.
Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987)).
83. Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 260.
84. See Karmel & Paden, supra note 82, at 3 (stating that "there is considerable
uncertainty as to the respect to be accorded a final judgment in a class action when a class
member collaterally attacks that judgment").
85. Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 539 U.S. 111 (2003).
86. Id.
87. See id. See also Richard 0. Faulk & John S. Gray, Twenty-six Words that
Reopened a Toxic Can of Worms: The Supreme Court and the Never-Ending Story of
Agent Orange, at http://www.mealeys.com/attomey%20views/toxcom.html (Sept. 5,
2003) (stating that the Supreme Court "opened the door to plaintiffs to collaterally attack
a global class settlement... [and] failed to give any guidance on how or when class
action settlements can be reopened").
88. Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 2001). The final
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Stephenson defendants had met their obligations from the settlement and
had relied on the settlement as the termination of their obligations.8 9 As
a result, the Stephenson decision raised the question of whether the
defendant companies received the benefits that they believed they had
bargained for in the settlement. 90 In Amchem and Ortiz, however, the
settlement had not been finalized and the Supreme Court ruled on the
cases on direct appeal.9' Neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants in
Amchem or Ortiz were denied any benefit of their bargain. The effect of
the Supreme Court's holding in both Amchem and Ortiz was to remand
the case back for division of the class into subclasses to assure that all
class members would be adequately represented in the ensuing
settlement.92
The Stephenson decision, therefore, raises important policy
considerations for established settlements. By opening the global
settlement, the Second Circuit's decision has increased the likelihood
that future plaintiffs will forum shop.93 Forum shopping undermines one
of the primary goals of the class action system by reducing the judicial
efficiency that was accomplished through the consolidation of similar
claims in the original action.94 Plaintiffs and defendants will be required
to relitigate the same issues. 95 In addition, the Stephenson decision does
not limit the possibility of multiple collateral attacks. Absent class
members are not precluded from challenging a settlement on the same
payments from the settlement fund were made in 1997 and a total of $196.5 million was
distributed to veterans or their families. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Bob Van Voris, Agent Orange Suits Alive, U.S. Court Says, THE NAT'L L.J.,
December 17, 2001, at A5 (stating that after the Second Circuit's decision the defendant
companies were unsure of the number of subsequent challenges that would be brought by
veterans).
91. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 608 (1997) (stating that
objectors appealed upon the district court's finding of a fair settlement); Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 830 (1999) (describing the procedural history of Ortiz in
the district court and court of appeals).
92. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 629; Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 864.
93. Charles Lane, Supreme Court Allows Agent Orange Suit; Vietnam Veterans with
Recently Diagnosed Ailments Can Sue Despite 1985 Settlement, THE WASHINGTON POST,
June 10, 2003, at A6 (speculating that the Second Circuit will become a "venue of
choice" for individuals seeking to reopen a settlement).
94. See Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for "Adequacy"
in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 765, 779 (1998)
(noting that "multiple determinations of the same issue undermine the very efficiencies
sought to be achieved by the class action mechanism").
95. The need to relitigate an issue is a concern in another context, dueling class
actions. "Yet dueling class actions-two or more class actions commenced on behalf of
the same class or overlapping classes, which present claims arising out of the same
transaction or occurrence-are rampant." Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions,
80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 462 (2000).
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grounds as other absent class members. Defendants to an established
settlement will be unsure how many challenges the settlement must
withstand before being finally closed.96 The Stephenson decision,
therefore, casts doubt on the stability and finality of other existing
settlements. While Amchem and Ortiz provide guidance for parties in
pursuit of a settlement, the Stephenson decision takes the reasoning from
these decisions and extends it to an existing settlement.
97
Specifically, the Stephenson decision designates the Second Circuit
as a target to pursue a challenge to an existing settlement.98 The Second
Circuit has demonstrated, at a minimum, a willingness to consider
reopening an established settlement. The Stephenson decision, however,
has provided little guidance, and the Supreme Court's decision has
compounded this lack of guidance.
Several open questions remain to be answered: What degree of
difference among class members is necessary to reopen a settlement?99
To what degree may new information be considered in reevaluating the
adequacy of the representation in the settlement? These questions will
only be answered as additional challenges are brought and the courts
have the opportunity to refine the Stephenson reasoning. A probable
outcome is an increased burden on court dockets as claimants attempt to
define the reach of Stephenson. This result will undermine two of the
primary goals of the class action system, efficiency and a reduced burden
on court dockets. 00
The Stephenson decision also decreases the likelihood of future
settlements in class action litigation.'0' As stated previously, settlements
are a critical component of class action litigation because they allow
defendants to dispense with multiple claims and reduce expensive
litigation costs. 10 2 Ultimately, defendants accept some liability in order
96. See Faulk & Gray, supra note 87 (questioning why a defendant would settle a
class action if the settlement payments do not guarantee an end to the litigation).
97. Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co., 273 F.3d 249, 261 (2001) (stating that
"Amchem and Ortiz suggest that Stephenson and Isaacson were not adequately
represented in the prior Agent Orange litigation"). But see In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 749 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (providing reasons that the 1984
Agent Orange settlement was desirable and reasonable for the plaintiffs, defendants and
the public). The benefits of the settlement for the plaintiffs included the opportunity to
realize a recovery without proving a causal relationship between their illnesses and Agent
Orange, an element of the case that the court recognized would have been difficult to
establish based on the available scientific data. Id.
98. See supra note 93.
99. See supra note 64 for arguments that Amchem and Ortiz created uncertainty as to
the degree of difference necessary between class members to necessitate subclassing in
the initial settlement.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
101. See supra note 96.
102. See supra note 17.
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to finalize their degree of liability.10 3 Following Stephenson, class action
defendants may have less incentive to settle class action claims. First,
the financial resources of the class members in future claims will be
distributed among the various subclasses, thus leaving a smaller amount
to retain the various attorneys for each subclass. 0 4 It is conceivable that
defendants will pursue litigation with the objective to see a claim
abandoned, knowing that each subclass may not have sufficient financial
resources to support the claim through a costly litigation.
Second, the Stephenson decision will reduce the confidence that
defendants have in a settlement. Defendants will be willing to settle a
claim only if they can be assured that the class will be closed and remain
closed. Without the confidence that the class will not be reopened in the
future, the defendants will place more confidence in securing a favorable
judgment-a result that may be reached only through a costly litigation.
The fundamental problem with the Stephenson decision is the
Second Circuit's disregard for the principle of finality. The parties
cannot be returned to their pre-settlement position and the defendants are
therefore denied the protections that they bargained for in the
settlement. 10 5  A de novo review of a previous certification, as the
Stephenson court conducted, does not ensure any finality to the
settlement. The Stephenson court refused to recognize its own prior
approval of the settlement and class. A mere change in a court's
composition could cast doubt on the finality of a previous settlement, one
that the parties may have relied on for years.
V. The Ninth Circuit's Alternative to Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co.
An alternative line of reasoning to the Stephenson reasoning has
developed in the Ninth Circuit.'0 6 This reasoning, adopted in Epstein v.
103. Evidence of the acceptance of liability existed in the Agent Orange settlement as
both the plaintiffs and the defendant companies asserted that the federal government was
ultimately culpable for the use of Agent Orange during the war. See Peter Montague &
Maria B. Pellerano, Victory for Viet Vets, THE NATION, Feb. 18, 2002, at 24.
104. See Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE
L.J. 27, 56-57 (2003) (stating that "[i]ndeed, there is even the risk that reformers bent on
protecting the rights of absent class members might go so far as to make class actions too
cumbersome for plaintiffs' attorneys to pursue effectively, thereby sabotaging the rights
of the tort victims they hope to protect.").
105. See In Re Factor VII or IX Concentrate Blood Prod. Litig., 159 F.3d 1016, 1020
(7th Cir. 1998) (barring attorneys who participated in the settlement from challenging the
adequacy and fairness of the settlement because the settlement had been finalized and the
funds dispersed).
106. See also Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 17 F.3d 1553 (3d Cir. 1994)
(holding that absent class members could not collaterally challenge because the appellate
procedure provided due process); Nottingham Partners v. Trans-Lux Corp., 925 F.2d 29
(1 st Cir. 1991) (holding that absent class members could not challenge the determinations
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M.C.A., Inc.,1 °7 stands for the proposition that the balance between
adequate representation for absent class members and the finality of a
settlement is best protected by the court that certifies the class and the
settlement. 10 8 While the Ninth Circuit's approach has been criticized, 10 9
this rationale avoids the uncertainties established by the Stephenson
decision.
The Epstein decision terminated a complex procedural history. 10 In
Epstein, the Matsushita Electric Industrial Company's acquisition of
M.C.A., Inc. prompted the filing of parallel class actions, a Delaware
state court action and a federal court action. 1 ' The class in the state
court claimed that M.C.A.'s directors breached their fiduciary duty
during corporate restructuring.1 12 The class in the federal claim asserted
a violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.113 Ultimately, the
parties in the state court action reached a settlement approved by the
Delaware Chancery Court, which included a release of the federal claims
in the action.1 14  The Delaware Court of Chancery found that the
representatives of the class had adequately represented the class and that
the members of the plaintiff class failed to opt out of the settlement.' 
15
The Ninth Circuit rejected the appellants' argument that they had an
unrestricted right to collaterally challenge the adequacy of representation
in class actions. 16 The court stated that a class member's due process
right to adequate representation is protected through the adoption of
appropriate procedures by the trial court."l 7  The court ruled that an
absent class members' due process right to adequate representation is
protected by the certifying court, initially, and then by the appellate
court, on direct appeal, not by the opportunity to bring a collateral
attack. 1
8
The Epstein decision, therefore, places the burden of balancing
of the certifying state court in federal court if the state adhered to necessary procedural
safeguards).
107. 179 F.3d 641 (1999).
108. Id. at 648.
109. See Patrick Woolley, Availability of Collateral Attack for Inadequate
Representation in Class Suits, 79 TEX. L. REv. 383 (2000) (providing arguments against
Epstein v. MC.A., Inc.).
110. See Kahan & Silberman, supra note 94, at 766 (providing a summary of the
litigation preceding the Ninth Circuit's decision in Epstein v. M.C.A., Inc., 179 F.3d 641
(9th Cir. 1999)).




115. Id. at 645.
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adequate representation within the class and the finality of the settlement
on the certifying court. Upon a challenge of inadequacy by an absent
class member, the critical review would not be into the unique
circumstances of the class member, but rather whether the court
conducted the appropriate procedures during its certification.119 The
ability to bring a collateral attack would be limited to those situations
where the court in the initial class action litigation failed to adopt and
adhere to procedural safeguards for the class. An adoption of this
standard eliminates many of the questions that are raised by the
Stephenson decision. As a result, the standard provides a more reliable
basis to balance the adequacy of representation with the finality of
established class action settlements.
First, the Epstein rationale limits the additional burden on courts
because it relies on a review of the certification procedures and not a
relitigation of all of the issues in the prior certification." ° Unlike the
Stephenson rationale, the additional burden placed on courts would not
be significant because the court would only be reviewing one aspect of
the settlement, the procedure by which the class was certified. This
rationale places confidence in the trial court's review of the initial
settlement and the appellate court's review on direct appeal. In addition,
it eliminates the possibility that a court will conduct an independent
review of the settlement years later or that other information will be
introduced to challenge the settlement that was not presented during the
initial proceeding.
Second, the procedural standard adopted in Epstein preserves the
class action's role as a useful tool for both defendants and plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs and defendants can be assured that the settlement will be
upheld if the proper procedures were followed when it was established.
Application of the standard adopted in Epstein reduces the need for the
parties to look to a full trial to secure a final judgment and the possibility
that a settlement will be reopened in the future. Once the procedures are
determined to be adequate, the inquiry ends and the parties can rely on
the settlement to survive any additional challenges based on inadequate
representation. This stability allows defendants and plaintiffs to regard
their settlement as the final disposition of their dispute, thereby
promoting the future use of class actions as a negotiation tool and a
reliable means to settle mass tort claims.
119. See Kahan & Silberman, supra note 94, at 788.
120. See id. at 788-89 (arguing that class members should only be permitted to assert
a procedural argument once the question of adequacy was settled). Marcel Kahan and
Linda Silberman advocated the adoption of a "process" standard prior to the resolution of




Despite the Supreme Court's recent decisions detailing the
procedures that a court must follow to ensure adequate representation for
all class members in a class action settlement, 121 an open question
remained on the application of these decisions to existing settlements.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in Stephenson, retroactively
applied the Supreme Court's reasoning from Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor 122 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.123 to an established and
expired settlement, the Agent Orange class action settlement.124 The
Stephenson decision marked a significant extension of the Supreme
Court's reasoning and carries significant implications for the stability
and finality of existing class action settlements.
To ensure that class action settlements remain a viable device for
plaintiffs and defendants to avoid class action litigation, the Court will
need to provide additional guidance to define the reach of its Amchem
and Ortiz reasoning. The Court missed an opportunity to provide this
guidance in the Stephenson case, but future opportunities will likely arise
due to the critical role that class action settlements play in mass tort
litigation.
The Court should seek to preserve the functions of the class action
system, accessibility and efficiency, 125 as well as to protect the finality of
existing settlements. To achieve these objectives, the Court should limit
challenges to a class action settlement to a review of the procedures
utilized during the settlement. This approach balances adequate
representation for class members with the finality of class action
settlements. As a result, the interests of absent class members are
protected and the settlement of a class action claim continues to serve as
an available remedy in mass tort litigation.
121. See infra Part III.A for a discussion of Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591 (1997) and Part III.B for a discussion ofOrtiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815
(1999).
122. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
123. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
124. See infra Part IV for a discussion of Stephenson v. Dow Chemical, Co., 273 F.3d
249 (2d Cir. 1999).
125. See infra text accompanying notes 8-10.
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